E Pluribus Unum

Questions on Reasoning...

2012-01-22T12:57:00.004+08:00

'There is almost nothing right or wrong which does not alter with a change in climate. A shift of three degrees of latitude is enough to overthrow jurisprudence. One's location on the meridian decides the truth, that or a change in territorial possession. Fundamental laws alter. What is right changes with the times. Strange jutice that is bounded by a river or mountain! The truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other.' Blaise Pascal, Pensées)

Our practical reasoning, or reasoning for that matter, is dependent upon principles. For example, we do not act upon the impulse of killing for we reason that life, in principle, is valuable. Reason cannot operate in vacuo, it needs to be rooted in principles. One's practical reasoning would be in a 'stagnant' state of inaction if it be without principles. Our principles in turn are derived from, inter alia, religious, moral and cultural factors. Surely, there would be diversity of principles here. There would surely be principles that would carry less moral weight than others. There could even be contradictory principles. How then would we judge between these principles? How then do we achieve reconciliation?

If all these principles are subjective and there is no Truth in these principles per se, then I can see no reason (unless there is a logical error) in criticising the reasoning of those of whom we do not agree with. But why then do we reject the reasoning of a terrorist in his efforts to bomb up a building? If all principles are subjective principles, why do we intuitively reject the reasoning of a suicide bomber? Perhaps, this may imply that there are such things as objective principles. Granted, it would be controversial as to what those principles are, but this does not mean that there is no objectivity in it.

As Christians we have found this objectivity, and He is not an abstract, but a person. His name is Jesus Christ; the Logos, the Reason, the Principle that upholds the universe. Only in Him (consciously or subconsciously) can we distinguish good reasoning from bad reasoning. He is the ultimate reference point. And in Him should our reason rest, in Him should we put our trust.

In Principio Erat Verbum: The Power of Words

2011-12-24T00:30:00.000+08:00

Martin Heidegger noted in his ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ that:

‘… words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are. For this reason the misuse of language, in idle talk, in slogans and phrases, destroys our authentic relation to things.’

I think modern translations of the bible have too much of a conversational tone, it regards words as ‘labels’; it forgets that it is in words that we come to contact with reality. And if words in Scripture do not possess the grandeur of poetics, then it would not correspond with the ultimate reality of God, the Word that was there in the beginning. It does not inspire devotion, but only reminds us of the mundane.

Modern translations of Scripture are not food for the soul, they do not lead us to transcend the natural plane unto the supernatural. An example would be necessary here, let us have a look at John 1:14:

The Word became a human being and, full of grace and truth, lived among us. We saw his glory, the glory which he received as the Father's only Son. (GNB)

And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth. (KJV)

I believe that it is self-evident that the former seemed to have muffled the mystery of the Incarnation, the God-Man. It seems so bland. But in the latter, it is as if power is flowing through these words. It conveys a sense of mystery and awe. It allows us to contemplate the 'naked' Truth, unfettered and not concealed by the misuse of words.

Ignorance and Abortion

2011-12-17T17:37:00.000+08:00

From the vantage point of a Catholic, life begins at conception. Life, in this sense, would mean ‘personhood’. If one is a human person, then it would be morally wrong to kill him.

But even if one would not accept the proposition that life begins at conception, one must at least be humble enough to accept that there is no conclusive evidence as to when life begins. If this is the case, abortion would still be morally wrong.

This is due to the following proposition: that if one is unsure as to when ‘life’ begins, it would be morally irresponsible for one to engage in an abortion.If we are unsure as to whether ‘personhood’ is conferred upon an embryo, for example, then there is a possibility of the embryo being a person.

If there is a possibility of the embryo being a person, then it would be, by analogy, like shooting a moving bush (unsure of what’s behind it) hoping that it be a deer rather than a human being. In such a circumstance, if the ‘thing’ behind the bush turns out to be a human, there is gross negligence on the part of the shooter.

In a similar way, going for an abortion, not knowing whether the embryo is a person or not shows moral irresponsibility and may constituted as gross negligence.

Democracy's Christian Roots

2011-12-17T17:08:00.002+08:00

‘just as our language and culture is steeped in the Bible, so too is our politics. From human rights and equality to our constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy…’ – David Cameron

Ain't this an intellectual blow upon the face of atheistic secularism? Prime Minister David Cameron in his King James Bible speech showed an understanding that the democratic project began way before the Enlightenment, it is rooted in biblical religion, in Jerusalem.

Equality – due to the fact that God made us, that we are all made in the image of God.

Constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy – due to the fact that since we are equal, one should not be made an unwilling subject of another.

Fundamental human rights – are inalienable due to the ontological view of man that biblical religion has proposed. Christianity offers a dignitarian view of man. That man has rights not because legislatures say so, but that it is God-given, by man's nature as children of God.

Aktenversendung

2011-12-16T14:30:00.000+08:00

Aktenversendung was a practice of the German legal system, during the early modern period. It was where the courts sought for expert opinions from the law faculties of universities to come to a decision in a criminal or civil trial. Though this practice came to an end when Bismarck reconstituted the courts in 1878, the idea of a healthy interchange between legal scholarship and practice, may still be relevant in our discussions on modern legal systems.

It is relevant, as is it would, by analogy, be able to address the notion of an intolerant atheist secularism. Modern secularism denies the influence of God in political affairs. It is a denial that man is made in the image of God. It refuses to consider the proposal of redemption offered by the Church.

Such a distorted form of secularism, which prohibits religious influence on public affairs, will lead to a sort of disintegration of society. When I use the term 'disintegration', I would mean 'lacking integration' or 'lacking a binding factor', for it is religion that binds society together by promoting a culture of tolerance through to acknowledgement of the common brotherhood of mankind. Without religion, there is a great tendency that human persons (who are the building blocks of society) would descend into an overtly individualistic culture. Where self-interest prevails over the common good. In such a scenario, at best, individuals would be isolated from each other; atomistic and self-seeking. At worst, it would not be much of an exaggeration to claim that the Hobbesian 'war upon each and all' may come to existence in even 'civil' society.

The above, of course, can be avoided, if political authorities are open enough to the vantage point of religious institutions, to be open to accept a dignitarian view of man, upon which all rights of man flow; that all men are equal due to the fact that we are all children of God.

There must be an intellectual interchange, a sort of Aktenversendung between political and religious institutions, with each sphere respecting its own autonomy, so to create a public culture which is open to the notion of a free and virtuous society, that respects the dignity of every human individual. This would allow a genuine social solidarity, instead of isolation or disintegration. Then, what Jacques Maritain termed as 'civic friendship' would be a possibility, where social relationships would not be merely reduced to the mere contractual (as it is today).

NB: When I refer to religious institutions, it would mean that of the Judeo-Christian tradition, of which is convinced that 'next to the Blessed Sacrament itself, your neighbour is the holiest object presented to your senses' (C. S. Lewis, Weight of Glory).

I would also like to emphasize that this interchange between religious and secular authorities does not imply an 'altar and throne' alliance, but rather an advisory role of religious institutions to the policy-making role of the state.

Abortus???

2011-12-15T23:00:00.000+08:00

Short and Simple. Using the term ‘abortion’ to mean the termination of a pregnancy, desensitizes people from the true nature of things; that it is the murder of innocent and defenseless human persons.

Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex

2011-12-06T09:26:00.001+08:00

Law is a distinct form of political order. But order is not for order's sake. Order is a means to an end. Nobody, except those with OCD, would desire order as an end. But 'order for order's sake' is what is argued by legal positivists. H. L. A. Hart, J. Raz, H. Kelsen and those of the tradition of analytical jurisprudence claim that law is nothing but a social instrument to regulate human behaviour. The question that is left unanswered here would be 'why should we regulate human behaviour?' I hereby postulate that legal positivism provides a deficient, if not dangerous, view on the nature of law.

It is deficient in the sense that it fails to see law as moral enterprise. Positivism has been highly effective in discerning the function of the law, but not its purpose. The purpose of a particular instrument cannot be detached from its function. It would be silly, for example, to understand the functions of a car, how the pistons and brake system works and forget about the purpose of the car; which is to be able to ferry people around to places. Similarly, the order that the law provides for society, is for a certain telos or purpose; towards what Aristotle calls as human flourishing.

Law cannot be detached from the goal of human flourishing, all its norms and regulations should be directed towards this goal. If a law departs from this goal (eg. permitting the mass murder of its citizens), then that particular law has departed from what John Finnis refers to as the focal or central meaning of the term law. An unjust law is not law in the truest sense of the word.

One may argue that such a view of law would only be tenable if the criteria for human flourishing is objective. And since moral relativism is slowly taken root in society both in a de jure and de facto sense. The view of law as a moral enterprise would not be a practical option.

Let us consider this further. If we reject the notion that there are moral truths, then this rejection does not correspond with empirical data. If moral values are nothing but social preferences, then we would not argue about it. For example, we would not argue with one who insists that vanilla ice cream is better that chocolate, the reason being that it is a matter of preference. But we would argue about a particular action (eg abortion, euthanasia) as unjust or immoral. Such an argument would only make sense if there is an objective standard to appeal to. Such an appeal to external moral demands would refute the notion of moral relativism which interpret moral values as preferences rather than objective standards.

The argument above may indicate that there is an objective standard of morality, but this would not solve the issue that there is much controversy over what is the content of this objective standard. I would have to concede that there is difficulty over ascertaining moral truths purely through reason. This perhaps is due to the fact that man's reason is confined to certain boundaries, to his mental faculties and observational senses. However, this does not mean that one should abandon the search of objective moral standards.

Controversy should not deter us from seeking the truth, in fact, such controversies should serve as a form of motivation instead; that one should desire more to transcend moral uncertainty. I see no such desire in legal positivism, I see only intellectual laziness, a refusal to pursue the truth to the end.

Legal positivism cannot depart from the idea that it is force or coercion that legitimizes the law. Legal positivism may try to justify that the systemic validity of laws lie not in coercion but in, for example, a social norm or custom; it cannot depart too far from the notion of might is right, or might is law, for there is no conceptual link between law and morality. Since there is no such conceptual link, this would substantially weaken the ability of one to appeal to standards of morality against an unjust government. This would also absolutize the state, in the sense that its legal norms ought to be obeyed regardless of whether or not it has failed to abide to the standards of justice. This indeed is self-evidently dangerous.

Only when we view the law as a moral enterprise would we be driven to ascertain first, objective moral principles, and then, its practical implications. Only by cultivating such a view through the education of future politicians, judicial officials and lawyers would the state understand that its role is limited, and is always at the service of human flourishing.

Duo Sunt

2011-12-04T14:42:00.001+08:00

It is often thought that the separation of Church and State arose out of the Enlightenment ideals. However, it is not so. This concept of the separation of Church and State was an idea that was born much earlier in history.

Pope Gelasius II in his letter Duo Sunt, written in AD 494, distinguished the 'auctoritas sacrata pontificum - the holy authority of the bishops' from the 'regalis potestas - royal power'. This separation was re-emphasized by Accursius in the 1200s, where 'neither the pope in secular matters, nor the emperor in spiritual matters has any authority.' The impetus behind this insistence on the separation of Church and State may have been out of the Church's desire for autonomy, but it is primarily due to the nature of the role of the Church.

The Church's role is not political governance, but that of the proclamation of the Good News; that Christ has died for our sins. The Church makes a proposal of the possibility of redemption to Man. The Church should maintain a critical distance from the world, that it may serve as a sign that the material world is not all there is. We are in the world as Christians, but not of the world. The maintenance of impartiality of impartiality and objectivity by having a critical distance would allow the Church to convict political societies of their wrongdoings (eg. the errors of communism, the culture of death, etc.).This, on a side note, would preclude the idea that in order to maintain the separation of Church and State, moral values rooted in religious views ought not be brought into the public sphere.

The Church must practice a sort of contemptus mundi, to constantly remind us, as a prophet would, that one should never absolutize or idolize the State. As George Weigel noted, 'The Church must have no desire to be Caesar, and Caesar must not pretend to be God.' If the Church acts like the State, there possess a high tendency to depart from its primary role in the proclamation of the Good News. And if the State becomes the Church, in the sense of portraying itself as the 'saviour' of the people (eg. Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, etc), then it is merely deluding itself and the people it claims to save.

Sicut In Caelo Et In Terra

2011-12-02T11:00:00.001+08:00

We have that sentiment for heaven, even though we may not be conscious of it. The memories of our past, that nostalgic feel. Then a thought is evoked: 'How I wish it could be like before? What joy we had in times past! Why can't I turn back the time?'

I propose that this longing for the past is, in fact, a longing for the future. What future? the hope of heaven perhaps. Our telos, our real destiny; the longing for our true home. Heaven is where all our genuine friendships will be relived; where the sense of intersubjectivity, the sense of love, care and affection that we gave and felt, would come alive.

This longing for the past, from an existentialist point of view, is a form of hope, that one day all that was true, good and beautiful will not be caught up in the past and will be in the eternal present of heaven. The hope of heaven is the antidote to nihilism, a nihilism, as Allan Bloom puts it 'that enjoys itself on the way to oblivion convinced that all of this - the world, us, relationships, beauty, history - is really a cosmic joke.'

Nihilism encourages an extreme form of individualism. Since there is no objective meaning in life, then I create my own values, a sort of Nietzschean experiment of transvaluation. I would be, myself, the 'Superman' of Zarathustra. This chaotic freedom would be the deathblow to all societies, in the sense that in would go contrary to the communal aspect of society. The political question of 'how ought we live together?' is replaced by 'how ought I impose my will on others?' Such ideas breed tyrants.

The above then can be summarized into the following points:

Man has a longing for heaven;
A heaven that has an intersubjective dimension;
This intersubjectivity must permeate society;
to avoid 'atomism', an overtly individualist and self-sufficient perception of self;
of which may give rise to oppression and tyranny.